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Introduction
Which role do concepts play in a person’s actions? Do concepts underwrite
the very idea of agency in somebody’s acting? Or is the appeal to concepts in
action a problematic form of over-intellectualization which obstructs a proper
picture of genuine agency?
Within the large and complicated terrain of these questions, the debate
about know-how has been of special interest in recent years. In this paper, I
shall try to spell out what know-how can tell us about the role of concepts in
action. I will argue that the fact that people possess and exercise know-how
is indeed suited to deliver a number of important insights as to where and
how concepts play a role in action. But I shall argue that these insights are
limited in that they fail to cover the whole realm of relevant phenomena.
Section 1 introduces the topic of know-how and the ways in which one
may try to address it. Section 2 presents an interpretation of Gilbert Ryle’s
seminal work, according to which know-how explains what he calls ‘intelli-
gence’ in terms of normative guidance. Section 3, goes on to offer an account
of this notion in terms of responsible control. Given this background, sec-
tion 4 establishes that actions which are exercises of know-how are indeed
dependent on concepts and conceptual activity. However, the final section 5
considers actions which are not exercises of know-how and explores the lim-
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its of an appeal to know-how with respect to the entire relationship between
concepts and action.
1 The Question of Know-how
There are good reasons for approaching the topic of concepts in action with
a special focus on the question of know-how and its exercise. After all, a
core proportion of the actions of human persons are exercises of know-how.
People do not merely do what they do, but know how to do so. This is not
an acccident. We care about our actions, our agency, and our capacities. We
aim to get it right with respect to how best to do something. If we succeed in
such endeavors, it is in virtue of our possessing and exercising our knowledge
of how to succeed. In this sense, know-how is a concept at the very core of
our self-understanding as acting and knowing beings.
But let us leave these pre-theoretical considerstions aside and ask: What
does it mean to know how to do something?
There are many ways and methodologies with which this question may
be approached, and indeed is approached in the current debate about know-
how.1 One may begin with the linguistic analysis of the English expression
‘to know how to’, and maybe of cognate expressions in other languages.
Alternatively, one may begin with the question of the cognitive science of
know-how, with the picture of a subject’s knowledge and agency which is
salient in the empirical literature. Both of these approaches have fruitfully
been employed in the recent literature.2 But I shall pursue a different project
here. This is not to say that these questions are somehow not important or
even relevant. It is just to say that they should not be the core focus of an
account of know-how and instead enter the debate in a second step. As I
shall argue, there is a specific explanatory point to the concept of know-how
1 For an overview, see Fantl (2008), Bengson & Moffett (2011b), Pavese (2016), Cath
(2019b), and Löwenstein (2019).
2 Accounts starting with the analysis of language include Stanley & Williamson (2001),
Bengson & Moffett (2007), Stanley (2011b), and Stanley (2011a). Accounts starting
with cognitive science include Bzdak (2008), Wallis (2008), Adams (2009), and Devitt
(2011).
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which should take center stage in any account of this concept. And it is
in the light of this core aim that we can then also assess the question how
know-how is expressed linguistically and how it is realized empirically.
In presenting this proposal, I largely rely on my recent book Know-how as
Competence (2017), setting the account defended there in a broader context.3
In this paper, however, I will not be able to say anything substantive about
the way in which my proposal sheds light on the questions at the center of
other methodologies.4
I have claimed that know-how is at the core of our self-understanding as
creatures who care about their actions. This idea has been a central tenet
of the debate about know-how ever since it was cast into its current form by
Gilbert Ryle. In his paper “Knowing How and Knowing That” (1945) and
his monograph The Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle discusses know-how with
respect to its role in explaining what he calls ‘intelligent practice’. This idea
also underlies my proposal for a full account of know-how – an account which
follows Ryle in several central respects, but pursues these ideas much further
(cf. Löwenstein 2017, § 2.6).5
3 Along the way, I will also be able to address some of the many open questions and
further issues facing my proposal which have recently been taken up in Brandt (2018),
Constantin (2018), Habgood-Coote (2018), Jung (2018), Löwenstein (2018a), Löwen-
stein (2018b), Cath (2019a), Elzinga (2019), Worthmann (2019a), Worthmann (2019b),
Heimann (forthcoming), and Worthmann (this volume).
4 On the linguistic expressions of know-how, compare Löwenstein (2017), Ch. 7–8. On
the cognitive science of know-how, compare Löwenstein (2017), §§ 6.5–6.7.
5 This proposal is part of what appears to be a new wave of Rylean thought in the debate
about know-how. A number of philosophers have independently come to the convic-
tion that Ryle has been widely misunderstood in the recent debate, and that Ryle’s
ideas still yield important and promising insights for a positive account of know-how.
These include Sax (2010), Hornsby (2011), Elzinga (2016), Kremer (2016), Bäckström
& Gustafsson (2017), Kremer (2017), Small (2017), Tanney (2017), Waights Hickman
(2018), Elzinga (2019), Worthmann (2019a), and Worthmann (this volume). What I
present here is what I take to be the most plausible reading and development of Ryle’s
views, even if I cannot defend it in detail against related views.
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2 Ryle on Know-how and Normative Guidance
Ryle’s begins with the idea that know-how plays a distinctive role in un-
derstanding intelligent practice. He tries to illuminate this relationship with
respect to what he calls the “intelligence-concepts” (Ryle 1945, 3) which char-
acterize certain performances. For example, one may do something wisely,
cunningly, correctly or successfully, as well as inefficiently or stupidly (cf.
Ryle 1949, 26; Ryle 1945, 1–3, 5, 14). But what is meant by ‘intelligence’ in
the first place? What is the common strand in all ‘intelligence-concepts’?
It is important to note that Ryle’s ‘intelligence-concepts’ do not only
include concepts which refer to what one would ordinarily conceive of as the
presence of intelligence. Cases of lack or deficiency in intelligence – such as
stupidity – are also included. This has led John Bengson and Marc Moffett
to make the following proposal:
Hereafter, we reserve ‘intelligence’ (lowercase ‘i’) for intelligence
in the narrow sense, namely, that which is intelligent but not
stupid, idiotic, and so forth; we will use ‘Intelligence’ (capital ‘I’)
as an umbrella term covering all states of intellect and character,
including intelligence (in the narrow sense), stupidity, and idiocy.
(Bengson & Moffett 2011b, 5–6)
While this distinction is indeed very important, I think that there is a better
name for what Ryle has in mind here. What he calls ‘intelligent’ practice is
just another name for normative practice. In fact, Ryle comes close to saying
so himself.
When a person knows how to do things of a certain sort (e.g., cook
omelettes, design dresses or persuade juries), his performance is
in some way governed by principles, rules, canons, standards or
criteria. (For most purposes it does not matter which we say.)
(Ryle 1945, 8)
Clearly, what unites these terms is that they are expressions of the norms of
the performances in question. What people know how to engage in are nor-
mative activities. This is also plausible because Ryle’s ‘intelligence-concepts’
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all contain evaluations (cf. Ryle 1949, 26; Ryle 1945, 1–3, 5, 14). They do
not describe performances in a detached, uninvolved manner. They contain
judgements of these performances as to whether or not (and to what extent)
these live up to the activity’s norms.6 Thus, the distinction of ‘capital-‘I’ vs.
lowercase-‘i’ intelligence’ can be understood as the distinction between the
fact that an activity is normative at all and the fact that a person’s perfor-
mances of that activity actually live up to those norms (cf. Löwenstein 2017,
§§ 1.1–1.3).
So far, I have merely established a first step in a full account of know-how.
To know how to do something requires actually living up to the norms of the
activity in question. But know-how also requires more than that.
First, it requires sufficient reliability in living up to those norms (cf. Ryle
1949, 44–45, 125). To know how to do something, a person needs to be
sufficiently reliable in achieving success – whatever ‘success’, i.e. the meeting
of the activity’s norms, may come down to in the case at hand. Of course,
nobody is perfectly reliable and reliable in every circumstance imaginable.
But, as Ryle puts it, it is necessary that one “knows how to bring it off in
normal situations.” (Ryle 1949, 125)7
Second, reliability is necessary, but not sufficient for know-how. In a
catch-phrase, know-how requires reliability for the right reasons. Ryle writes:
What is involved in our descriptions of people as knowing how to
make and appreciate jokes, to talk grammatically, to play chess,
to fish, or to argue? Part of what is meant is that, when they
perform these operations, they tend to perform them well, i.e.
6 I will bracket the nature and status of these norms here. Intuitively, some activities are
governed by socially constructed norms, while others – foraging for food, say – appear
entirely mind-independent. But at the level of abstraction on which we operate here,
this does not make a difference. Compare: There are many and many kinds of facts of
which one may have propositional knowledge. Analogously, there are many and many
kinds of activities which one may know how to engage in.
7 This may seem problematic because it is very difficult to define exactly which situations
count as ‘normal’ (‘enough’). How much wind or intoxication or acoustic distraction
or lack of lighting makes it the case that we would not expect a darts champion to
perform well? I shall bracket this problem here (cf. Löwenstein 2017, §§ 1.4, 1.7), but I
would like to note that it is salient in all abilities and that a conception of abilities can
account for this very convincingly, as shown by Romy Jaster (2019).
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correctly or efficiently or successfully. Their performances come
up to certain standards, or satisfy criteria. But this is not enough.
[...] To be intelligent is not merely to satisfy criteria, but to apply
them; to regulate one’s actions and not merely to be well-regu-
lated. A person’s performance is described as careful or skilful, if
[...] [h]e applies criteria in performing critically, that is, in trying
to get things right. (Ryle 1949, 29)
These considerations establish a distinction between genuine know-how on
the one hand and what I would like to call a ‘mere’ ability on the other hand.
Know-how is a reliable ability to do something well because one is guided by
an understanding of what it takes to do it well. Or so I propose to cash out
Ryle’s talk of ‘applying’ criteria as opposed to merely conforming to them.
In short, then, know-how involves normative guidance and this distinguishes
it from mere ability (cf. Löwenstein 2017, § 1.4).
Let me illustrate this distinction with Ryle’s own examples.8 He holds
that machines like clocks and non-human animals like circus seals have mere
abilities as opposed to know-how. In Ryle’s words, they have “pure or blind
habits” rather than “intelligent capacities” (cf. Ryle 1945, 15; Ryle 1949,
42). With respect to human persons, Ryle suggests that “[t]he ability to
give by rote the correct solutions of multiplication problems” (Ryle 1949, 42)
does not amount to genuine knowledge how to multiply. For if one gives
correct solutions by sheer rote, then one does not possess an understanding
of multiplication and one does not give correct answers in virtue of being
guided by this understanding. Instead, one merely parrots what one has
learned by heart – an achievement of memory rather than of knowledge how
to calculate.
I have argued that we should follow Ryle’s lead and understand know-how
as a specific kind of reliable ability – an ability to reliably meet the norms
of an activity in virtue of normative guidance. In this sense, know-how is a
8 There are many other applications of this distinction between genuine know-how and
mere ability. For example, it shows that no plausible Rylean view can hold that ability
is sufficient to know-how (cf. Löwenstein 2017, §§ 5.3–5.5). And it sheds light on core
notions from cognitive science, such as ‘procedural knowledge’, which may well fall short
of distinguishing genuine know-how from mere ability (cf. Löwenstein 2017, §§ 6.5–6.6).
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cognitive achievement.9 In the next section, I shall offer a full account of this
idea.
Before doing so, let me make a methodological remark. If know-how can
indeed be understood in this way, then we will have an account of know-how
as competence or as skill. For, arguably, skills or competences are precisely
those kinds of abilities which exhibit further such epistemic features over and
above ‘mere’ abilities.10 However, this point is entirely compatible with the
fact that there are cases where we ordinarily say that somebody ‘knows how
to do something’, but cannot do so herself – for example that a sports teacher
‘knows how to’ do a certain trick, but has never learned to perform it herself.
But in these cases, we fail to distinguish mere knowledge or understanding of
or about an activity from a full-blown competence to engage in that activity.
We fail to distinguish a mere part of know-how – the understanding of the
norms of an activity – from the whole phenomenon – the reliable ability to
succeed in virtue of such an understanding.
This distinction between genuine know-how and mere knowledge or un-
derstanding of or about an activity (cf. Löwenstein 2017, §§ 2.1–2.2)11 can
be seen as a sibling of my earlier distinction between genuine know-how and
mere ability. It is salient in cases of people who cannot engage in an activity
themselves, but show a great understanding of these activities in other ways.
This point has been illustrated by Ryle with respect to literary critics (cf.
Ryle 1949, 49), by Ellen Fridland with respect to sports coaches (cf. Fridland
2012, 9), and by many others. In making this distinction, however, I do not
claim that we need to correct or restrict the ordinary use of ‘to know how to’
in any way. What I propose is just to distinguish the phenomena as clearly
as we can. We can discuss where exactly terms like ‘know-how’ should be
applied in a second step.
At this point (if not earlier!), the question of the exact linguistic analysis
9 This has also been stressed by Bengson & Moffett (2011c), Carter & Pritchard (2015),
Kotzee 2016, among others.
10 The relationship between the concepts of know-how, skill, and competence is controver-
sial, but nothing much depends on this in the present context. For further discussion,
see Fridland (2014), Kremer (2016), Pavese (2016), among others.
11 This distinction also sheds light on a number of examples and puzzle cases which have
been discussed in the literature about know-how (cf. Löwenstein 2017, §§ 5.1–5.2, 5.5).
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of the English expression ‘to know how to’ becomes very pressing, especially
since some philosophers have appealed to such analyses in order to promote
views of know-how.12 However, there are good reasons to understand ‘to
know how to’ as polysemous – i.e. as being able to express two distinct, but
related concepts (cf. Löwenstein 2017, Ch. 7). Thus, it is no mystery why we
speak of ‘knowing how to do something’ in very different cases. As long as
we distinguish the phenomena clearly enough when we do philosophy, this is
just fine.
3 Responsible Control
The preceding section has suggested that know-how is an ability to do well in
a certain activity because one is guided by an understanding of what it takes
to do well in that activity. I shall now go on to spell out more fully what it
is to understand an activity and to be guided by such an understanding.
The core idea of this proposal is that normative guidance can be under-
stood in terms of what I call ‘responsible control’. That is, a person exercising
know-how has control over their performances, and this control is responsible
in the sense that it does not merely happen to meet the the norms of the
activity in question, but is aimed at doing so. For lack of a better term, I
have dubbed the emerging view ‘Rylean responsibilism’.
I would like to introduce this account with respect to something Ryle
himself already gestures at – the idea that know-how is closely related to what
I would like to call ‘assessment capacities’ (cf. Ryle 1949, 55). An assessment
capacity with respect to a certain activity in this sense is the capacity to
accurately judge one’s own acts and those of others as good, bad, better or
worse performances of the activity in question. And given that individual
acts are always assessed within the context of a specific situation, a capacity
to make such assessments is ipso facto a capacity to assess situations with
respect to the question what would count as a good performance of a given
12 These critics include Stanley & Williamson (2001), Bengson & Moffett (2007), Stanley
(2011b), and Stanley (2011a). Elsewhere, I have argued that these arguments fail (cf.
Löwenstein 2017, Ch. 8).
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activity in this situation – in other words, with respect to the obstacles and
options the situation offers.
My proposal is that the understanding of an activity which guides com-
petent actors just is such a capacity to assess performances of the activity
one knows how to engage in (cf. Löwenstein 2017, § 4.1). On this basis, we
can understand the guidance involved in intelligent conduct by appreciating
the role of self -assessments – of assessments of one’s own performances and
of one’s own surroundings. Again, Ryle gestures in this direction when he
talks about how skills are learned from instruction:
[A]s the child learns to do the things, he also learns to understand
better and apply better the lessons in doing the thing. Hence he
learns, too, to double the roles of instructor and pupil; he learns
to coach himself and to heed his own coaching[.] [...] We are all
trained in some degree to be our own referees, and though we are
not, all or most of the time blowing our whistles, we are most of
the time ready or half-ready to blow them, if the situation requires
it, and to comply with them, when they are blown. (Ryle 1949,
148)
I content that these considerations about acquiring skills from teachers are en-
tirely general. Everybody who possesses and exercises a competence ‘doubles
the role’ of the practitioner and the critic – she assesses her own performances
and tries to live up to the potential for improvement.
Thus, guidance by an understanding of an activity can be understood
as responsible control of one’s acts in the light of assessments of self and
situation (cf. Löwenstein 2017, § 4.4). More fully, to be guided by an under-
standing of the norms of an activity just is to exercise the capacity to assess
one’s own performances and one’s options and to act in the light of these
assessments in order to meet the norms of the activity in question.
Given this outline of my proposal, I shall now focus on the way in which
such an account of know-how sheds light on the question of concepts in action.
This will be the topic of the next section. But especially with this goal in
mind, it is important to address at least one concern in the remainder of
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the present section: Does the appeal to assessing and acting in the light of
assessments lead to an overly intellectualized account of intelligent practice?
Predictably, I do not think so. The nature of know-how is both practical
and intellectual. It is a kind of ability which can only be fully appreciated in
virtue of its cognitive and epistemic aspects. In this sense, I contend that my
proposal views know-how as intellectual enough, but not too intellectual. It
is located squarely between the prominent ‘isms’ in the debate about know-
how, intellectualism and anti-intellectualism.13
The key to dispel the threat of over-intellectualization is a general insight
about competences and know-how – an insight which also applies at the level
of the assessment capacities which are involved in know-how. Namely, the ex-
ercises of such capacities can take many different forms including completely
unreflective, automatic, even non-intentional performances. To illustrate,
consider the following example:
I walk down the street and happen to see a sign with words writ-
ten on it. I do not need desires or reasons in order to read what
it says on such a sign. I might even have clear desires and rea-
sons not to read what the sign says – say, because I do not want
to pollute my mind with advertisements. But I still do read the
sign and I read it correctly. I exercise my know-how completely
automatically. (Löwenstein 2017, 78)
Arguably, performances like such acts of reading do not qualify as intentional
actions, however one may construe this term14, but nevertheless exercises of
know-how (cf. Löwenstein 2017, Ch. 3). And this also applies to making
assessments and to acting in the light of them.
For example, one can intentionally assess a situation beforehand and in-
tentionally perform the act one has consciously judged as best. Alternatively,
one can also assess what one does in action, during a performance. One may
realize that one is on the way to complete a very good performance and
13 On demarcating these ‘isms’ and taking up an in-between position, see also Löwenstein
(2017, esp. 2–3, 287–292), Small (2017), Constantin (2018), Worthmann (2019a), and
Worthmann (this volume).
14 On this issue, compare Wilson & Shpall (2012) and Setiya (2014).
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therefore make sure to keep on track. Or one may see how one’s present
course of action could be improved and take advantage of a better option (cf.
Montero 2010; Montero 2013). Finally, one can also assess one’s own acts
after performing them, for example when they are completely unreflective
automatic performances. Such routine acts or even pure reflexes may never-
theless be understood as guided by an understanding of the relevant activity.
For if such routines and automatisms have been intentionally cultivated in
such a way that their exercises reliably live up to the norms of the activity,
then these exercises can themeselves be seen as guided by an understanding
what it takes to do well in that activity (cf. Löwenstein 2017, § 3.4).
Crucially, the very same considerations apply to completely automatic
assessments of self and situation. When the assessment one reaches during
or after performing is also an automatic reaction to the situation of which one
becomes aware only after the fact, it may nevertheless be a genuine exercise of
the competence of assessing oneself and one’s situation. This is arguably one
of the most important aspects of genuine competence. A hallmark of genuine
expertise is that it does not require occurrent thinking about or other forms
of explicit attention to certain aspects of one’s performances and options (cf.
Fridland 2014).
In sum, then, given the fact that know-how can also be exercised un-
reflectively and even automatically, and given that the same holds for the
assessment capacities involved in know-how, the account of responsible con-
trol I have offered does not threaten to over-intellectualize know-how.15
4 Know-how, Concepts, and Propositions
The preceding section has suggested that the notion of responsible control
underwrites the idea of normative guidance which is crucial for a full account
15 One may object that my proposal leads to a vicious regress or an explanatory circle
because the assessment capacities involved in know-how cannot be mere abilities or
abilities which just happen to be successful in a lucky way, but must themselves be
cases of genuine competence including normative guidance. Arguments along these
lines can be found in Brandt (2018) and Heimann (forthcoming). Elsewhere, I have
attempted to solve this problem (cf. Löwenstein 2017, §§ 4.5–4.7; Löwenstein 2018b).
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of know-how. I shall now go on to argue that this involves concepts as well
as propositions and indeed propositional knowledge.16
With respect to concepts, I take it that my argument is very straight-
forward (cf. Löwenstein 2017, § 4.2). To understand an activity and to be
guided by such an understanding in the form of an assessment capacity re-
quires having and using a suitable concept of the activity in question.17 This
should already be intuitively plausible on any unanalyzed notion of a guid-
ing understanding of an activity. And it follows straightforwardly if such
an understanding is cashed out as an assessment capacity in the sense just
explained. After all, assessing an act as a performance of a given activity
just is assessing whether or not it falls under one’s concept of that activity.
Of course, this is not (merely) a question of ‘yes’ or ‘no’. It is a qualitative
matter which admits of degrees of normative adequacy. But, crucially, so
does the corresponding concept. To illustrate, in assessing some act as a
performance of, say, play-acting, one does not only ask whether the concept
of play-acting simpliciter applies to it – i.e. whether what we have in front
of us is play-acting in the first place. Further, one also asks to what degree
the qualitative concept of play-acting well applies to that performance. The
degrees to which it meets the relevant norms are mirrored in the degrees in
which the concept of good play-acting applies to it, however this ideal may
be specified in the case at hand.
I shall now go on to argue that propositions and propositional knowledge
play an equally important role for essentially the very same reasons. To begin
with, the very form and content of an assessment is already propositional.
Take the assessment I reach when I assess my current acts of, say, teaching as
too dull and boring. In such a case, I form a judgment with the propositional
content that my teaching performance is too dull and boring. But this is only
16 I shall bracket the details of the nature and function of concepts, propositions, and
propositional knowledge (cf. Laurence & Margolis 1999; Margolis & Laurence 2011;
McGrath 2012; Ichikawa & Steup 2012). My present arguments are compatible with a
wide variety of views on these issues.
17 Thus, my proposal has affinities with objectivist intellectualism (cf. Bengson & Moffett
2007; 2011c). Still, I contend that this view falls short of going all the way with respect
to the crucial task of explaining intelligent practice (cf. Löwenstein 2017, Ch. 9, esp.
§ 9.1).
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the first step in appreciating the nature of such assessments. For suppose
that you make such an assessment and you get things right in virtue of the
fact that you possesses a genuine understanding of the activity in question
and exercise a genuine assessment capacity to do so. If this is what happens,
then you reach a true verdict, you reach it non-accidentally, and you reach it
non-accidentally precisely for the right reasons. Arguably, this is a paradigm
case of propositional knowledge.18
Thus, Rylean responsibilism does reserve a crucial role for propositional
knowledge in the form of assessments, for objectual knowledge of activities
in the form of states of understanding, and for concepts and conceptions of
doing things. Still, it does not identify know-how with such knowledge as
intellectualists do. However, the debate about intellectualism has brought
out some crucial results about the candidate knowledge states which also
apply here (cf. Löwenstein 2017, esp. § 8.4). Most importantly, the knowl-
edge reached by making an assessment does not require any sophisticated
conception of the relevant acts and situations. Some people can give helpful
descriptions of these, but some cannot. In fact, even expert practicioners
sometimes give false descriptions. But descriptions are not necessary, at all.
Instead, the assessments can be demonstrative, and they must be if they are
supposed play a role in the responsible control of these performances in these
circumstances.19
In sum, concepts and propositional contents are a necessary ingredient in
the form of responsible control which is distinctive of know-how.20 In fact,
this conclusion can also be established in at least one crucial further way,
namely by appealing to the fact that ascriptions of know-how create opaque
18 This story straightforwardly fits the way in which virtue reliabilists try to account for
propositional knowledge in general. Indeed, I take it that an assessment capacity is
an example of what Ernest Sosa (2015) calls an ‘epistemic competence’ or John Greco
(2009) an ‘intellectual ability’ or Lisa Mirracchi (2015) a ‘competence to know’.
19 In fact, the relevant assessments are essentially indexical, to borrow a famous phrase
from John Perry (1979). I must conceive of my acts and options de se – i.e. as mine
– if my knowledge of these is supposed to guide my conduct responsibly. In the same
vein, I must understand my options as mine here and now.
20 In fact, there is a plausible case to be made for a dependency in the other direction, as
well. For discussion, see Wiggins (2012), Löwenstein (2013), Kremer (2016), Löwenstein
(2017), and Worthmann (2019a), among others.
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contexts.21 But I shall bracket these considerations here. Instead, I would
like to return to the worry that my proposal threatens to over-intellectualize
know-how.
A very persuasive challenge along these lines has recently been proposed
by Benjamin Elzinga. He presents an account of know-how in terms of self-
regulation which is very close to the view I defended here (cf. Elzinga 2016;
Elzinga 2019). However, he holds that concepts and propositions are not nec-
essarily involved in know-how thus understood. To drive this point home,
he appeals to studies about rats an honeybees and argues that their behav-
ior exhibits the kind of self-regulation and control sufficient for know-how
(cf. Elzinga 2019). Honeybees, for example, “are able to adopt truly novel
flight-paths in displacement studies” and “novel route choice of this kind re-
quires a cognitive map” (Elzinga 2019, 7). This is crucial: “The deployment
of map-based navigational strategies is where the intelligence required for
knowing how comes into play because to know how to do something is to
have a resilient, novelty-responsive ability.” (Elzinga 2019, 7–8) The same
case can also be made for rats and their navigational skills. However, the
debates about animal cognition and about the nature of map-like represen-
tation do not firmly point to any involvement of concepts and propositions:
“It is therefore a philosophically and empirically open question whether rats
are capable of propositional thought. If rats know how to navigate their
environment, then it’s an open question whether know how requires propo-
sitional knowledge. It may be that know how requires some other kind of
representational knowledge.” (Elzinga 2019, 12)
This line of argument is very persuasive, but it still fails to fully establish
that there is know-how without concepts and propositions. I think we face
a dilemma here.
On the one hand, such control and self-regulation with the aid of map-like
representations may turn out to require concepts and propositional represen-
tation, after all. This view is defended by Peter Carruthers (2006), among
21 This has been pointed out most prominently by Steel (1974), Carr (1979), Hawley
(2003), and Williams (2008). I discuss these issues in detail in Löwenstein (2017,
§§ 6.1–6.2).
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others. While Elzinga offers plausible objections against some of Carruthers’
arguments (cf. Elzinga 2019, 10–12), I take it that this issue is not yet settled.
And on a view along the lines of Carruthers, where control and self-regulation
with the aid of map-like representations do require concepts and propositional
representation, my account predicts that we have a case of genuine know-how
here and no problem will arise.
On the other hand, it may turn our that there is a form of control and
self-regulation with the aid of map-like representations which somehow falls
short of genuine concepts and propositions. In this case, my account predicts
that the creatures in question possess fascinating and sophisticated abilities,
but abilities which nevertheless fall short of genuine know-how. Again, I take
it that this is unproblematic. A problem will only arise if we have sufficient
independent support for the view that these are indeed cases of genuine know-
how. Elzinga takes himself to have established this (cf. Elzinga 2019, 7–8),
but I am not convinced yet.
To see this, I would like to distinguish a bare form of control and self-
regulation from a responsible form of control and self-regulation. I take it
that there are clear cases of bare control and self-regulation, namely computer
programs which perform complex statistical or probabilistic calculations very
quickly and also implement some form of mechanism for double-checking and
adjustment. In such a case, I think it is correct to say that the program has
an ability to perform these operations and that it controls and self-regulates
its calculating. At the same time, I contend that this happens merely in a
bare, but not a responsible form. It is an impressive ability, but still a mere
ability as opposed to a genuine case of know-how. After all, the computer
program does not possess an understanding of these calculations, it does
not understand what it takes to calculate well, and it is not guided by such
an understanding. Genuine know-how requires responsible control in the
sense that actors understand their acts as good and bad or better or worse
performances of the given activity. And this structure of understanding as,
I take it, is the mark of concepts and propositions.
With this background, I can restate my dilemma in response to Elzinga’s
challenge. For all we know, it is an open question whether creatures like
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rats and honeybees exhibit bare control or responsible control. In the second
case, I am happy to grant them genuine know-how. In the first case, I am
happy to deny them genuine know-how, however impressive and sophisti-
cated their abilities may be. Either way, it remains true that concepts and
propositional thought are essential for know-how because they account for
the very responsibility in responsible control and normative guidance.22
5 Acting without Know-how
I have argued that concepts play a key role in actions which are exercises of
an agent’s know-how. However, it is important to note that not all action is
an exercise of know-how. What does this mean for the problem of concepts
in action?
To begin with, one may worry that it is cheap and moot to claim that not
all action is an exercise of know-how, pointing to cases like breathing while
sleeping and squinting in the sunlight. Such performances are no exercises of
know-how, but simply because they are no actions in the sense of intentional
actions. However, intentional action is precisely where the very focus of the
problem of concepts in action lies. So, in order for my point to have any
proper traction, I need to show that even some intentional actions are not
exercises of know-how. This may look like a daunting task, partly because
it seems to require an account of what makes an action intentional.23 But I
think I can circumvent this issue.
However one may define intentional actions, there is an independent dis-
tinction within this realm, originally introduced by Arthur Danto (1965),
between basic and non-basic actions. Some actions are done by doing some-
thing else. But actions can also be done simpliciter or directly – i.e. not by
doing something else. An action is basic if and only if it is of the latter kind.
For example, when I intentionally blink my eyelid, I do not do so by doing
anything else, but rather directly. In contrast, if I give my friend a wink, I
22 Similar considerations also apply to other examples of non-human animals, of very small
human infants, and also of machines and robots (cf. Löwenstein 2017, § 6.6).
23 Compare note 14.
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may do so by blinking my eyelid. Blinking my eyelid, then, is a basic action.
In the debate about know-how, is is widely held that one can perform and
be able to perform basic actions, but that one cannot know how to perform
them.24 Intuitively, there is just nothing to be known with respect to blinking
my eyelid such that this knowledge may play any role in my actual doing so.
This intuition can be substantiated more fully given the Rylean respon-
sibilist account of know-how sketched earlier (cf. Löwenstein 2017, 34–35):
I have argued that know-how only concerns activities which are structured
by norms, and that guidance by an understanding of norms is the key to
understanding the intelligence of the relevant performances. This normative
structure can be expressed by saying that certain acts count as good or bad
and better or worse performances of the relevant activity. Given a suitable
context, for example, a specific way of playing a ball counts as a wonderful
serve. But what this means is that somebody serves wonderfully by play-
ing a ball in that specific way. The normative relation of an act’s counting
as something requires the structure of doing something by doing something
else – the very structure which is distinctive of non-basic actions. Therefore,
basic action is never an exercise of know-how.
If this conclusion is true, regardless which specific account of know-how
supports it, then the attempt to illuminate the role of concepts in action
with appeal to know-how has clear limits. Given that there are intentional
yet basic actions, thinking about know-how will offer no help with respect
to the question whether and how concepts play any role here. Instead, this
burden will shift over to the notion of intentionality in intentional action – a
task well beyond the scope of this paper.
But maybe my conclusion is not true. Maybe the appeal to basic action
fails to establish a class of intentional actions without know-how, after all.
I shall end this section with two considerations along these lines – as a final
push in order to explore the full significance of know-how for the question of
concepts in action.
First, while it is widely held that one cannot possess know-how with
24 Proponents of this view include Carr (1981), Katzoff (1984), Stanley & Williamson
(2001), Snowdon (2003), and Noë (2005).
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respect to basic actions, some philosophers disagree. For example, Kieran
Setiya (2012) holds that I do know how to perform basic actions simply
because I am able to perform them intentionally. But this raises the question
what such know-how may consist in. He writes that “knowing how to perform
a basic action is being disposed to act on the relevant intention when one
has it” (Setiya 2012, 296). Such a disposition, however, falls short of genuine
know-how because it fails to account for the intelligence of its exercises –
whether or not one shares my view that this explanatory task should be met
by appealing to normative guidance and responsible control. What Setiya
describes may simply be a mere ability.
Second, one may grant that basic actions are not exercises of know-how,
but go on to ask: How clearly are we even able to distinguish basic from
non-basic actions? This, I take it, is a paradigm instance of the general
vagueness and context-sensitivity of attributions of know-how (cf. Löwenstein
2017, § 1.7). One may plausibly hold that it would be odd to say that I know
how to wave my hand and that doing so is a basic action. But consider
somebody who has to acquire the ability to do this in the first place, or
maybe to re-acquire it after an accident. In such a case, it is natural to say
that the person learns how to wave their hand and that she does so by doing
something else – by contracting certain muscles, say. Arguably, such a shift
of context makes it equally natural to speak of knowing how to wave one’s
hand. Thus, the demarcation of know-how varies with the context-dependent
line between basic and non-basic action (cf. Löwenstein 2017, § 44–45).
Given this result, one may worry whether there is any clear case of a truly
basic action in the first place. This point has been explored most prominently
by Michael Thompson (2008) and Douglas Lavin (2013). They argue that
the notion of a basic action is problematic in part because any action, even
an allegedly basic one, is divisible into parts which are actions themselves
– just like any length is divisible into parts which are themselves lengths,
however small. On this view, my argument that concepts are involved in the
exercise of know-how will, mutatis mutandis, cover all intentional actions,
simply because the set of basic actions is empty.
However, there are good reasons to reject this conclusion. As Kevin Lynch
18
(2017) has argued, the key feature of basic actions is that something is done,
but not by doing something else. The relevant question is in which sense the
parts of a basic action are actually ‘something else’. I think that it yields
precisely the right criterion.25 Context-dependence notwithstanding, actions
like contracting a muscle are clearly not done by doing something else. Thus,
the distinction between basic and non-basic action still stands.
I have argued that know-how fails to account for all actions since some
of these are basic actions the exercise of which may involve abilities, but not
know-how. Thus, whatever the topic of know-how entails about the role of
concepts in action is limited to non-basic actions.
Conclusion
I have argued that know-how is a pervasive and indispensable aspect of our
lives as more or less rational agents and that, as such, know-how is a crucial
key for understanding the role of concepts in action. But even if I am right
that this unlocks core insights about this topic, it has failed to open all the
doors. An account of know-how does not speak to the question whether and
how concepts are involved in intentional yet basic actions. Here, we are back
to a familiar variation on our topic, the question whether and how the very
intentionality of an action is itself suited to illuminate the role of concepts
in action. Arguably, intentions themselves also require concepts such that
any intentional action is a conceptual activity in this sense. If so, there will
be two ways to see why intentional exercises of know-how are conceptual
activities – qua intention plus qua exercise of know-how. But regardless of
how one accounts for intentional action, there is a distinctive way in which
25 Still, I disagree with Lynch about individual cases. He suggests that even a complex
martial arts kata which consists in a whole sequence of movements is a basic action be-
cause the kata is defined as performing this very sequence and, accordingly, performing
that sequence is not ‘something else’ (cf. Lynch 2017, 317). But even so, this sequence
is divisible in parts which can also be performed individually without any relation to
the kata. In this sense, even the sequence is ‘something else’. Compare muscle con-
traction, which is not defined as a sequence of parts all of which can also be performed
individually.
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concepts play a role in exercises of know-how via normative guidance.26
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